Soft Image Game or Making Money: Saudi Not Because of Sports Washing
Soft Image Game or Making Money: Saudi Not Because of Sports Washing
The increase in Middle Eastern investment in sports is not aimed at eradicating stereotypes. It has to do with creating a new economy.
Only a few minutes into outlining his plan for turning Manchester City into a household name, marketing executive David Pullan became aware of two strangers listening in on his job interview from the back of the room.
Pullan afterwards discovered that they were Sheikh Mansour’s trusted advisors. The second-most well-known Manchester team, which had not experienced significant success in 32 years, was going to be purchased by an Abu Dhabi royal family member.
Pullan compared becoming City’s chief marketing officer in late 2008 to joining Amazon when it exclusively sold books or joining Starbucks before it went national. City required a lot of work before they could compete with the top clubs in England, let alone Europe.
Not only were the assets of City’s previous owner frozen, but he also left behind a team devoid of stars and millions of dollars in debt. There was no team-run website or social media presence for the club.
Pullan took over a marketing division with just three employees. The two major sponsors of City were a British travel business and a pop music radio station from Manchester.
Mansour promised to turn City from a joke to a powerhouse in his first letter to fans after the club was sold, promising to create “a team capable of sustaining a presence in the top four of the Premier League.”
The wealthy Mansour then used his bottomless financial resources to finance transfer market spending sprees, to upgrade training and medical facilities, and to hire a wide range of new staffers and executives.
City has won seven Premier League championships since 2012, and last month it earned its first Champions League trophy. However, it seems that the goals of the Abu Dhabi royal family transcend beyond what takes place on either side of the white lines.
The largest of the seven United Arab Emirates has been attempting to diversify its heavily dependent on oil economy and increase its worldwide prominence for many years.
Mansour, according to those who are aware with his thinking, sees City as a global advertising platform for Abu Dhabi as a tourist destination and for the state-backed companies of the emirate.
In 2009, the government-owned airline of Abu Dhabi became the jersey sponsor of City, and two years later, it obtained naming rights for the club’s stadium. A variety of Abu Dhabi brands are promoted on the billboards that surround Etihad Stadium.
Erling Haaland, Riyad Mahrez, and four other elite City players appeared in an Abu Dhabi tourist advertisement earlier this year to highlight the wide range of leisure pursuits available in the UAE capital.
Pullan stated to Yahoo Sports that “the regime in Abu Dhabi wanted a platform to market the country.” “They were aware that the wealth they derived from the immense deposits of oil and gas would soon run out. When the oil ran out, they wanted tourism to be their main source of income.
In recent years, “sportswashing” has emerged as the most fashionable all-purpose buzzword in sports commentary.
Oil-rich Persian Gulf regimes have poured unprecedented amounts of money into acquiring teams, organizing tournaments, and luring sportsmen, but they have come under fire for allegedly exploiting sports to repair their damaged image and divert attention from human rights violations.
The Abu Dhabi acquisition of Manchester City, however, shows that the reasons for these investments are frequently much more complex and strategic than a simple bait-and-switch strategy.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates are attempting to leverage investments in the sports sector to diversify their economies away from an overreliance on oil, hasten societal change, or gain political influence globally.
Recent expensive spending by Saudi Arabia to host numerous major international sporting events, entice players like Cristiano Ronaldo and Karim Benzema to the Middle East, and coerce the PGA Tour into a relationship it didn’t want revealed the level of the country’s desire.
Even Ronaldo and Lionel Messi have agreed to serve as tourism ambassadors for Saudi Arabia in support of a possible bid to host the 2030 World Cup.
Simon Chadwick, professor of sport and geopolitical economy at France’s SKEMA Business School, claimed that Saudi Arabia is “trying to position itself as the center of a new world order.”
The long-term goal of Saudi Arabia, according to Chadwick, is to try to purchase as many valuable sporting facilities as it can in the aim of establishing itself as a major global sports centre.
The Saudi Arabians want what you’ve got, Chadwick added, “is the simplest way to put it for an American audience.”
An outrageous marketing ploy sparked the Gulf States’ interest in sports as a source of travel and economic development. When two tennis greats exchanged ground strokes roughly 700 feet above Dubai’s Jumeirah Beach, the entire world took note.
The Dubai Tennis Championships’ administrators were eager to promote their low-key, rarely attended event in 2005.
They agreed to arrange a practice session on a specially built grass court atop the helipad of Dubai’s seven-star Burj Al Arab hotel in order to promote the event. They discussed this with Andre Agassi and Roger Federer.
Agassi and Federer, who were playing on a 689-foot-high platform without any obstacles to keep the balls or players from sliding off the edge, were photographed from above by photographers in a helicopter.
Jorge Ferrari, the official tournament photographer, joined Agassi and Federer on the helipad and captured up-close shots.
Ferrari said that the players “went off script and just had fun hitting balls into the sea” since they were having so much fun.
Ferrari met that afternoon to decide which pictures and videos to share with tournament organizers and an internal video team.
The following day, footage of the tennis show, which included the Dubai skyline in the background, traveled throughout the world, introducing millions of people to the richest and fastest-growing city in the UAE.
According to Barry King, general manager of Action UAE, a PR company that has handled campaigns for some of the nation’s major sporting events, “that really put Dubai on the global sports radar, as well as a destination.”
The helipad stunt undoubtedly contributed to the perception in the halls of power that sport might play a significant role in fostering economic variety and long-term non-oil growth.
The two wealthiest emirates in the UAE began making ambitious investments in sports in the years that followed.
Dubai and Abu Dhabi competed against one another through hosting highly publicized athletic events, as well as by sponsoring or acquiring renowned teams and franchises.
In 2007, Dubai’s sovereign wealth fund made an unsuccessful bid for Liverpool. The ruling family of Abu Dhabi reacted by buying Manchester City the next year. Following the building of a brand-new, world-class racing circuit, Formula 1 added the Abu Dhabi Grand Prix to its calendar in 2009.
That same year, Abu Dhabi completely renovated its largest stadium, allowing it to host five FIFA Club World Cups. In 2009, the PGA European Tour moved its season-ending competition to Dubai and made it the culmination of its yearly “Race to Dubai.”
Qatar went even further at the same time that Dubai and Abu Dhabi tried to use sports to increase their worldwide influence. Qatar became the first Arab nation to earn the privilege to host a World Cup on a snowy Zurich day in December 2010.
A mere week later, the Qatar Foundation agreed to pay $220 million to sponsor FC Barcelona’s recognizable uniforms. Then, in 2011, Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund bought Paris Saint-Germain, bringing Neymar, Kylian Mbappé, and momentarily, Messi to a struggling team.
According to observers, Qatar’s involvement in the sports industry is motivated by both economic aspirations and protecting the future of the dictatorial regime.
Strategic investments have strengthened Qatar’s diplomatic links and economic importance to certain strong Western countries, providing it geopolitical sway should tensions with Middle Eastern neighbors escalate into conflict.
Qatar is relatively small and extremely fragile, according to Chadwick. Therefore, one of its strategies for fostering interdependence with other nations has been to employ sport. We now have more causes to care about Qatar.
When Qatar was given the 2022 World Cup by FIFA, the nation lacked adequate soccer venues and a mass tourism infrastructure.
It started a tremendous building boom, employing migrant laborers to create everything from stadiums to highways, bridges, a metro system, and opulent hotels.
For 12-hour days of physically taxing outdoor labor in temperatures of 100 degrees or higher, migrant workers got pitiful remuneration.
Some people passed away during construction without receiving adequate explanations or family restitution, which drew criticism from people all across the world. Additionally, Qatar’s treatment of women and its anti-LGBTQ legislation drew criticism.
“The scrutiny was immense for many, many years,” remarked Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a fellow for the Middle East at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. “It might be argued that a lot more people are aware of Qatar’s record on workers’ rights than they otherwise would have been. Consequently, it is dual-purpose.
Goal 2030
For years, oil-rich Saudi Arabia, with its puritanical strand of Islam, lagged behind while its Middle Eastern rivals competed for influence through sports.
Then a new government took power that saw sports and entertainment as essential elements for developing a more diverse and sustainable Saudi economy and for addressing the demands of a population that was getting younger.
Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, launched his “Vision 2030” plan in 2016, promising that the nation will adopt a “moderate Islam” and would no longer be an entertainment wasteland.
Along with the first-time return of cinemas to Saudi Arabia in 35 years, the advent of music and cuisine festivals, fashion displays, concerts, and even parties, sports have been at the core of bin Salman’s cultural and economic revolution.
Since 2019, Saudi Arabia has played host to Formula 1 races, heavyweight boxing fights, and the richest horse race in the world.
The establishment of LIV Golf and the acquisition of Newcastle United of the English Premier League in 2021 were both supported by money from the royal wealth fund of Saudi Arabia.
The WTA chairman Steve Simon claimed he visited Saudi Arabia in February, and the ATP confirmed ongoing conversations with the country earlier this summer.
Saudi Arabia has recently stepped up its pursuit of some of professional soccer’s top international players.
Last month, the nation’s sovereign wealth fund purchased 75% shares in four top-flight Saudi soccer clubs, sparking a spending frenzy that brought Cristiano Ronaldo and players like Karem Benzema, N’Golo Kante, Ruben Neves, and Edouard Mendy to the gulf kingdom.
According to Chadwick, funding elite professional sport has turned into a competition. “There is a struggle in the Gulf to become the dominant force. We may argue that Qatar was the leader during the past ten years, but Saudi Arabia is lagging behind. They are attempting to outpace and outrun their competitors by moving as quickly and far as they can.
Should People Forget 9/11 in Games
Political repression has been worse and tougher in Saudi Arabia at the same time that social liberties have increased there.
According to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, “bin Salman has presided over one of the biggest crackdowns on human rights in the country’s history,” stressing the detention of nonviolent protestors and the incarceration of people for a lifetime for sharing critical posts about the government on social media.
Since bin Salman took office in 2015, the number of executions in Saudi Arabia has nearly doubled, according to a report released earlier this year by the non-profit group Reprieve.
A CIA investigation also came to the conclusion that bin Salman gave his approval to an operation in Istanbul, Turkey, that led to the murder and dismemberment of Saudi dissident and Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018.
According to Chadwick, “a new social contract is being formed” as a result of the contrast between Saudi Arabia’s expanded social freedom and its continued political repression.
The contract states that whatever you want — Cristiano Ronaldo, the WWE, Formula 1 racing — would be provided, according to Chadwick. That is yours to have. Don’t challenge us, the government is saying on the other side of the deal.
Visiting America?
The PGA Tour appeared to be ready to take the initiative in the struggle against Saudi Arabia’s expanding sway over world sport for a brief period of time.
Last year, after the Saudis established a competing circuit called LIV Golf and started attempting to entice some of the most well-known stars in the sport with record-breaking sums of money, the PGA Tour defended its territory in court and in the eyes of the public.
The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations released an email sent by British businessman Roger Devlin to PGA Tour policy board member Jimmy Dunne last Tuesday.
Devlin claimed in the email that he had been “invited” by Yasir Al-Rumayyan, governor of the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia, to propose a partnership between the PGA Tour and LIV Golf.
Devlin made a suggestion that the Saudi offer had run out when Dunne didn’t immediately begin to look into a truce.
Devlin warned Dunne on January 3 that the Saudis’ stance was “hardening” because they thought the PGA couldn’t compete with their “almost limitless financial resources,” and on April 14 he expressed concern that the Saudis might “doubledown on their investment” if they couldn’t reach an agreement with the PGA in “the next couple of months.”
Four days after sending that email, Dunne contacted Al-Rumayyan to start a series of top-secret talks that resulted in the astonishing agreement that was made public in June.
The Tour’s chief operations officer Ron Price said his company couldn’t afford to pursue a protracted struggle with LIV when pressed during Tuesday’s Senate hearing to explain the PGA’s justification for working with the Saudis.
LIV Golf, which is entirely supported by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, was a real threat to overtake other professional golf organizations, according to Price.
Could other American sports be at risk in light of the Saudis’ impressive power display? Could the Saudis or another oil-rich country invest in or acquire other American athletic properties?
The likelihood of breaking into the NFL appears to be extremely remote. Foreign ownership of NFL franchises is forbidden.
The NFL has allowed teams to be sold to larger groups in anticipation of the prospect that it may have to reconsider if franchise prices continue to soar and the pool of potential American buyers can’t keep up.
Additionally, a sovereign wealth fund won’t be investing in a majority share in an NBA franchise anytime soon, according to NBA commissioner Adam Silver, who made the announcement last Monday in Las Vegas at the Associated Press Sports Editors Convention.
Setting aside sovereign wealth funds, Silver stated that it is crucial for people to be in a position to manage their teams, be accountable to the fans, their partners, and the players.
Last week, it was made official that Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund had invested in Monumental Sports & Entertainment, giving it a small ownership in the Washington Wizards of the NBA, the Washington Capitals of the NHL, and the Washington Mystics of the WNBA.
Because franchises are selling for billions of dollars and it’s difficult to find ultra-wealthy people who can pay that, the NBA recently expanded passive investing opportunities to private equity firms and sovereign wealth funds, according to Silver.
Given that a wealthy owner may easily take advantage of Major League Baseball’s absence of a strict payroll ceiling, the league may be a target for sovereign wealth funds.
A MLB insider warned that just because a private equity fund can buy a minority share in a team, the league will automatically approve a sovereign wealth fund’s purchase. According to the insider, “There would obviously be extensive scrutiny through a review process to gauge the appropriateness.”
On October 8, 2021, Newcastle United fans holding “sold” signs and dressed in robes celebrate the club’s sale to a Saudi-led consortium outside the stadium at St. James’ Park in Newcastle upon Tyne, northeastern England.
– On October 7, a Saudi-led group acquired Premier League team Newcastle United, despite Amnesty International’s warnings that the purchase reflected
The fan puzzle
Some supporters may feel conflicted about their beloved team being purchased by autocratic governments.
Since he was 6 years old, Andrew Page has accompanied his father to Newcastle United games. The Newcastle resident has occupied the same seats in the east end of St. James’ Park for just over three decades. They are located three-quarters of the way up the stands and are level with the penalty area.
James claims that when his hometown club was bought by Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund two years ago, he felt “really disconnected” from his ecstatic friends, neighbors, and employees.
They rejoiced at the coming of the wealthy and aspirational new team owners who could take Newcastle United out of the middle of the pack. Some even carried Saudi flags or wore traditional Muslim head coverings as they entered St. James’ Park.
Months before, Page had threatened to boycott the club if the sale to the Saudis went through, but the fervor of his fellow supporters made him waver.
He claims that at the time, it didn’t only seem like the majority of Newcastle United supporters approved of the change in ownership. As much as 99.9%
Page claimed, “I didn’t know anyone else who felt like I did. “Boycotting under those circumstances was like relegating oneself to a lonely corner. It seemed completely ineffectual and pointless to attempt it.
Eventually, Page met several like-minded Newcastle fans who identified as “NUFC Fans Against Sportswashing,” an organization that rejects using victory to advance Saudi Arabia’s influence abroad.
Like Page, they felt awkward seeing their club’s uniforms feature the green and white of Saudi Arabia or refer to Yasir Al-Rumayyan as “His Excellency” on its official social media pages.
In October of last year, representatives of NUFC Fans Against Sportswashing spoke with Saudi activists about how they could track down and unite additional fans who were against the ownership. Page heard tales about the brutality of the Saudi administration and the dangers campaigners for human rights faced while defying the authorities.
I didn’t want to be a part of the Newcastle fans’ public image because I felt embarrassed about it, Page stated. “I figured the least you could do is actually carry out your boycott this time,” she said.
Since that time, Page hasn’t entered St. James’ Park. Last season, he missed Newcastle’s rise to fourth place in the Premier League and their first-ever Champions League qualification. Page is willing to make that cost. He only wants other Newcastle fans to voice their support for him.
Page cites Bayern Munich’s decision earlier this summer to end its sponsorship agreement with Qatar Airways and to stop having yearly training camps in the oil-rich nation as evidence that supporters have influence.
The club’s financial misappropriation by Qatar was denounced by enormous banners and workshops organized by Bayern supporters.
Soon soon, American sports fans might be facing the same problems as fans of Newcastle and Bayern Munich. The Middle Eastern weapons race for well-known sporting venues seems to be getting worse.
However, the Gulf States have a different viewpoint than Western audiences, who may see these investments as attempts to cover up authoritarian regimes’ violations of human rights.
They do not view the acquisition of prominent sports properties as sportswashing. It’s a part of a well-planned national strategy to advance their political objectives and build resilient, non-oil-dependent economies.
According to Durham University lecturer and Middle East political expert Christopher M. Davidson, “the recent spate of Saudi sports-related investments are primarily driven by rational economic motives.”
Sportswashing is mainly irrelevant to Saudi Arabia since Riyadh doesn’t care what the rest of the world thinks of the country’s record on human rights.
